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n recent years, the phenomenon of 
offshoring of service-related jobs, fuelled 
by the falling cost of worldwide I pour nos fins. Nous observons que la réponse légis-
lative aux délocalisations correspond peu à l’image 
habituelle des déterminants du protectionnisme. La 
dépendance envers les exportations, souvent asso-
ciée au libre-échangisme, est reliée à la résistance 
aux délocalisations. Les forces qui s’alignent dans 
cette bataille sont liées aux classes sociales plutôt 
qu’aux secteurs. L’éducation, conçue ici comme un 
indicateur de la capacité d’adaptation à la mondiali-
sation, a des effets significatifs mais mixtes. 
 
Communication présentée au 65e congrès annuel de 
la Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 
Illinois, April 7-10, 2005. Les auteurs remercient 
François Vaillancourt et Kenneth Scheve pour leurs 
commentaires sur une version antérieure, ainsi que 
Linda Lee, pour sa contribution à la collecte des 
données. Version préliminaire : les commentaires et 
suggestions sont bienvenus. 
information transmission, has achieved prom-
inence as the latest battleground of resistance 
to economic globalization. Although the issue 
has been very salient in public debates, it has 
not led—to date—to the adoption of major 
protectionist policies. It has, however, led to a 
good deal of political activity by labor groups 
and the introduction of a few pieces of 
legislation in Congress. At another level, this 
issue also has opened the door to protectionist 
demands directed at state governments. 
American state legislatures have a long history 
of protectionist interventions even if their 
range of available policy instruments is 
limited. Within that limited range, however, 
they are able to use state procurement 
contracts and other regulatory interventions 
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to grant preferences to local or national firms 
or, in the case of offshore outsourcing, to 
curtail their ability to shift parts of their 
activities abroad. Indeed, over the last two 
years, in response to this increasingly salient 
dimension of globalization, state legislators 
have been led to propose measures that seek 
to limit the flow of service jobs overseas. 
  
Although the economic effect of these new 
measures may not be very large, in the context 
of growing liberalization of markets every 
hurdle left holds the potential of impeding the 
further progress of globalization in ways that 
would have been unimaginable even only two 
decades ago. Also, since we are faced with a 
relatively new phenomenon that has not led, 
for example, to roll-call votes in the U.S. 
Congress, activity at the state level is the best 
available indicator of variations in the sources 
of political resistance to offshoring. Thus it is 
important to assess the political responses to 
these new issues raised by globalization, to 
identify their determinants, and to compare 
these determinants to those of the more 
traditional forms of trade protectionism. This 
is what this paper attempts to do, using data 
on levels of legislative activity in response to 
service-jobs offshoring as indicators of state-
level protectionist legislative activity. 
First, we summarize recent debates over 
offshoring, and compare them with previous 
and ongoing debates over trade-related 
manufacturing job losses. Second, various 
theoretical models of the politics of trade 
protectionism are discussed with regards to 
their usefulness in the explanation of levels of 
policy restrictions toward offshore out-
sourcing. The following sections present the 
model selected for analysis, the methodology 
and the empirical results. We find that the 
politics of response to offshoring is not trade 
politics as usual, as export orientation is 
actually positively related to our measures of 
legislative activity. The forces behind the first 
legislative salvos in the fight against offshoring 
are primarily aligned along class rather than 
sectoral lines, and education, which is often 
used as an indicator of capacity to adapt to 
the uncertainties generated by the forces of 
globalization, has significant but mixed 
effects. 
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The Services Offshoring Debate 
 
Offshoring1 is hard to define with precision. 
The simplest definition of the term is also the 
most politically expedient for opponents: It is 
the migration of jobs overseas. Vast 
improvements in communications tech-
nologies, along with the dramatic reduction in 
their costs, have transformed the way in 
which many firms operate in the services sec-
tor (or in manufacturing services). Basically, 
the notion involves shifting parts of the prod-
uction process to foreign locations, most often 
to take advantage of labor-cost differentials.  
 
On the face of it, this is not new: this has been 
going on for decades in the case of low-skill, 
labor-intensive manufacturing. What makes it 
relatively new is the fact that it affects a broad 
 
1 The term “outsourcing” is often used to describe 
the phenomenon, but “offshoring” is more precise. 
Outsourcing means acquiring parts or services 
from an unaffiliated company (domestic or foreign). 
Offshoring refers either to parts or services 
supplied by a foreign affiliate of the home company 
(offshore in-house sourcing) or by an unaffiliated 
foreign-based company (offshore outsourcing) (U.S. 
General Accounting Office 2004, 58).  
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range of jobs that used to be considered off-
limits to international market forces. Now, 
thanks to new technologies, service jobs such 
as data processing, call centers and software 
programming have become virtually rootless 
and can be massively shifted to low-cost 
countries. Significantly, also, offshoring is 
creeping up the ladder from low-skill jobs to 
highly technical occupations, and even 
scientific work. To borrow a quote from former 
Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorina: “There is 
no job that is America’s God-given right 
anymore” (cited in Drezner 2004). 
 
Because it generates insecurity in large 
portions of the American workforce, offshoring 
has become a highly salient political issue and 
has fuelled anti-globalization sentiments. In 
the media, offshoring is typically painted as 
the exportation of high-paying jobs to 
developing countries. An oft-quoted private 
report has estimated job losses due to 
offshoring in the coming decade at about 3.3 
millions (McCarthy 2002). For the white-collar 
workers, the increase in the resort to 
offshoring in services signaled the beginning of 
a new era when they too would have to face 
direct international competition. 
 
Economists, on the other hand, find benefits 
in offshoring in the form of lower prices and 
new possibilities, as some service firms might 
not be able to sustain competitive pressures 
without the economies generated by shifting 
parts of their activities to lower-cost areas. 
They also correctly point out that mainstream 
media are essentially looking at only one side 
of the coin, as “insourcing” is also an 
important phenomenon (Slaughter 2004). 
Many foreign firms import services from the 
United States or establish parts of their 
service-oriented facilities there, notably in 
specialized high-skilled services jobs. Indeed, 
the U.S. still has a net surplus in business 
services trade. Also, on the whole, even an 
annual loss of 300,000 jobs—which would be 
the worst-case predictions from current 
studies—still only represents about 0.2 
percent of the country’s total of about 130 
million jobs (Drezner 2004a). 
 
Still, some economists have expressed con-
cerns recently about potential damages to the 
economy resulting from offshoring, mainly 
through lower wages and a possible 
deterioration of the terms of trade (Samuelson 
2004; Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan 
2004). The problem becomes more important 
if wealth cannot be redistributed from 
shareholders to workers, as the latter group 
loses from offshoring, while the former stands 
to win most. While American industry should, 
on the whole, be able to gain high-paying jobs 
to compensate the ones lost, it does not mean 
that people losing jobs easily find new 
employment. Adjustment costs may be 
considerable, and that new reality puts more 
pressure on the workers, who must be flexible 
enough to adapt to the job market, which 
evolves now more quickly. 
 
Recent research on public opinion (Mayda and 
Rodrik 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) 
confirm that most people attribute benefits to 
globalization in general, but they also fear its 
potential impact on job security, including 
their own. The classic case of diffuse benefits 
and concentrated, highly publicized, losses is 
in effect here, and it shows in opinion polls. In 
May 2004, an Associated Press poll found that 
69 percent of Americans believe offshore 
outsourcing hurts the U.S. economy.2 In its 
2004 poll on American attitudes about 
international affairs (July 6-12), the Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations found that, while 
64 percent of the public had a favorable view 
of globalization, 72 percent thought that 
offshore outsourcing was “mostly a bad thing” 
while 22 percent saw it as a good thing. This 
result is in sharp contrast with their poll of 
“opinion leaders”, where these proportions 
were, respectively, 87, 31, and 56 percent.3
Empirically, there is no compelling evidence 
that offshoring has had severe adverse 
 
2 The poll was conducted for the Associated Press 
by Ipsos-Public Affairs, May 17-19 2004 
(www.ipsos-na.com/news/pdf/media/mr040607-
1tbzzz.pdf); cited in Drezner 2004b. 
3 See Bouton et al. (2004, 40-42). The report also 
shows that, although most people have a favorable 
view of globalization, they mostly perceive the 
impact of trade on American jobs as negative. 
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consequences. Exports of services are growing 
at a lower rate than imports, but this has had 
little effect on the job market. Comparing the 
services and manufacturing offshoring waves, 
we can see many similarities. White-collar 
workers have replaced blue-collar workers as 
the potential victims of globalization, and 
India has replaced Japan as the main 
destination for offshored jobs, but the 
differences between mainstream and academic 
opinions remain much the same. What 
distinguishes the two contexts is that, while in 
the 1970s and 1980s many American firms 
were facing direct import competition and 
joined the workers in their pleas for 
protection, now firm managers often find that 
shifting jobs overseas may be essential to 
maintaining a competitive edge. Consequently, 
while trade politics remained until recently a 
battle across sectorally defined lines of 
cleavage, pitting import-sensitive industries 
against export-oriented or import-dependent 
industries, the ongoing debates over 
offshoring mainly pits factors of production 
against each other. It is primarily a battle 
between labor and capital.  
 
In hindsight, studies have assessed the long-
term effect of manufacturing offshoring, 
showing the capacity of most workers to adapt 
to the shifting fortunes of their sectors of 
employment. For example, Kletzer (2001), in a 
study of manufacturing job losses in import-
sensitive industries, finds that between 1979 
and 1999, 63 % of those who had lost their 
job were employed when contacted by the 
Census Bureau, at a date which could be 
anywhere between one month and three years 
after the initial job loss. Among them, 39% 
had earnings that were at least as high as 
before, but one quarter took pay cuts of more 
than 30%. The median loss of earnings was 
about five percent. 
 
It is still too early to have similar studies for 
services offshoring, but those results are the 
best approximation of the impact. While the 
effects are not as dramatic as anti-
globalization activists might claim, the costs 
(or at least the potential costs) of offshoring 
cannot be dismissed as trivial. In this context, 
with more workers facing greater pressure, 
uncertainty, and the possibility of significant 
adjustment costs, it is not altogether 
unsurprising that calls for policy responses to 
this emerging issue on the globalization 
agenda are increasingly heard. Since there 
has so far been little legislative activity in 
Congress, and no roll-call votes that would 
allow us to apply standard political economy 
models of trade politics to legislative behavior 
at the federal level, we turn to the level of state 
legislatures, where a sizable number of bills 
addressing the issue of services offshoring 
have been introduced in 2003 and 2004 (Lee 
2004). Thus, in addition to addressing the 
relatively new issue of services offshoring, this 
paper also covers the relatively uncharted 
territory of trade politics at the state level. We 
seek to assess and explain variations across 
states in the number and intensity of 
legislative proposals to use the state 
governments’ limited arsenal of policy 
instruments to curtail the practice of offshore 
outsourcing and offshore in-house sourcing of 
services.  
 
The following section summarizes the different 
theory explaining political actions with respect 
to international trade. First, however, we 
present the dependent variable, which 
measures levels of legislative response to 
offshoring in the 50 states. 
 
Assessing State-Level Legislative 
Activity on Offshoring: 2003-2004 
 
In 2003 and 2004, state legislators in 35 
states have introduced 130 bills that included 
a total of 176 different measures. Offshore 
outsourcing was a major theme for several of 
the Democratic candidates in the 2004 
presidential election campaign, and this parti-
san emphasis is reflected in the fact that most 
of these bills were introduced by Democratic 
state legislators. Indeed. Of the 130 bills, 83 
were introduced by Democrats, 23 came from 
Republicans (14 were bipartisan and 10 were 
prepared jointly by the relevant committees). 
The data were compiled by the National 
Foundation for American Policy (2004) in the 
last two years following the mid-term 
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elections. After removing the few double 
entries (twin bills introduced both in the State 
Senate and in the State House), each bill was 
segmented into the different measures it pro-
posed. Some bills contain only one measure 
while others might include three or four 
different measures. Extreme examples are 
Ohio, with 10 measures on 3 bills and New 
York, with 7 measures on 7 bills. Those meas-
ures were then classified according to their 
eventual impact if adopted. The classification 
used is reproduced in appendix, ranging from 
limitations on private information leaving the 
state or country to studies on the impact of 
offshoring of services.  
 
To reflect the various levels of political 
reaction across states, we use three closely 
related variables (see Table 1, p. 12). The first 
is the number of bills introduced in each state 
legislature to address the offshoring issue. The 
second disaggregates each bill and reports the 
total number of anti-offshoring measures 
embodied in these bills. The third adjusts for 
the severity of these measures and consists of 
a summation, for all measures, of an index of 
severity ranging from 0.2 (least severe 
measure) to 1.0 (most severe measure).4  
 
Figure 1 (see p. 14) presents the geographical 
distribution of the first of these three 
variables, the number of bills introduced, 
across the 50 states. At first sight, this map 
shows that patterns of political reactions to 
the offshoring issue do not correspond to the 
usual patterns of support for protectionist 
legislation in the U.S. Congress (for example, 
Wade and Gates 1990; Martin 1995). The 
presence of states such as Washington, Idaho 
or Connecticut alongside more traditionally 
protectionist areas such as Ohio or Michigan 
at the upper end of the response scale sug-
gests that the politics of response to offshoring 
does not follow the same patterns as the 
politics of more conventional forms of protect-
tionism. We turn next to explanations for the 
levels of political response to offshoring. 
 
4 These measures are closely but not perfectly cor-
related (correlations of 0.935 between the first and 
the second; 0.891 between the first and the third, 
and 0.986 between the second and the third). 
The Explanatory Variables 
 
In this section, we introduce the variables of 
our explanatory model in relation to the 
various theoretical frameworks that seek to 
explain the politics of response to economic 
globalization. We start with the simple sector-
based attributes, most commonly associated 
with the Ricardo-Viner model of the political 
economy of trade (presence of import-sensitive 
industries; export-oriented employment). 
Then, we introduce factor-based variables, 
associated with the Stolper-Samuelson view of 
trade politics (labor union strength; firm 
concentration and education). The remaining 
variables are linked, respectively, to: the 
general economic context prevailing in each 
state (job growth); partisanship (percentage of 
Democrats in the lower chamber of the state 
legislature); and control variables for state size 
(Gross state product in services) and for the 
foreseeable effects of offshore outsourcing on 
each state’s economy. 
 
The Sectoral Approach: Is Offshoring a Case of 
Trade Politics as Usual? 
 
The two main approaches differ on a crucial 
assumption: factor mobility. In the sectoral 
approach (Ricardo-Viner), it is assumed that 
factors are not mobile between industries or 
sectors, at least in the short run. Factor 
specificity implies that, while international 
trade makes certain sectors better-off than 
others—since capital and/or labor is 
immobile—there will be winners and losers 
from trade. The winners will be in the favored 
sectors, where rate of returns and wages will 
rise, since sector-specificity implies that 
factors in other sectors are imperfect 
substitutes and cannot move freely to favored 
sectors. Accordingly, sectors made worse off 
by trade will see their sector-specific factors 
suffer through lower wages and lower rates of 
return. Thus the resulting conflict opposes 
import-sensitive and export-dependent 
sectors.  
 
Empirical work on the political economy of 
trade policy in the U.S. Congress generally 
shows that sector-specific attributes weigh 
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heavily in the balance of legislative decision 
making. Two variables commonly associated 
with this model at the state level are import 
sensitivity (proportion of the workforce 
employed in import-competing manufacturing 
industries) and export dependence (proportion 
of jobs depending on manufacturing exports) 
(e.g.: Baldwin 1985; Marks and McArthur 
1990; Martin 1995). Although the offshoring 
issue is conceptually different from trade 
protectionism, critics of anti-offshoring 
measures commonly claim that they are just 
another form of protectionism and involve the 
same political forces. We include these 
variables in our model to ascertain whether or 
not anti-offshoring politics fits this pattern. In 
short, if offshoring politics is trade politics as 
usual, then import sensitivity should be 
positively related to the level of legislative 
response, while the effect of export 
dependence should be negative. 
 
Import sensitivity is measured as employment 
in selected import-sensitive industries (accord-
ing to Griswold 1999) as a proportion of total 
state non-farm employment. Export depend-
ence is measured as the proportion of total 
state non-farm employment directly or indi-
rectly attributable to manufacturing exports 
(1997 data; see appendix for details). 
 
The sectoral model of the political economy of 
trade has limits when it comes to interpreting 
the politics of offshoring, however, because, in 
contrast with what is most commonly the case 
in the politics of trade, the interests of service 
workers that are vulnerable to offshoring and 
those of their employers are diametrically 
opposed. Thus there is a strong presumption 
that cleavages in the politics of offshoring 
should be primarily drawn along factoral lines. 
 
Labor, Capital, and “Human Capital” in the 
Political Economy of Offshoring 
 
The factoral model of the political economy of 
trade assumes some degree of mobility across 
sectors. As trade modifies the returns on 
sector-specific assets, factors move freely from 
sectors made worse off to sectors that gain 
from trade, until rate of returns and wages 
converge. However, there is a good chance 
that some factors will be affected more than 
others. The result is a conflict between factors, 
which could be between labor and capital or 
low-skilled and high-skilled workers. This, in a 
nutshell, is the Stolper-Samuelson model. 
When factors are relatively mobile and 
interests do not clearly align along sectoral 
lines, as ought to be the case for offshoring, 
class-based cleavages should prevail. 
 
We identify three relevant indicators of factor-
based interests at the state level. First, as a 
proxy for the political strength of labor, we use 
the proportion of the state’s civilian labor force 
that is represented by unions (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2002). This also is consistent 
with the very vocal position taken by unions 
nationwide against the practice of offshore 
outsourcing. Consequently, higher unionize-
tion rates should be associated with higher 
levels of anti-offshoring legislative activity. 
 
On the other side of this ledger, we use 
average firm size (in number of employees) as 
a proxy for the political strength of capital. 
This simple measure is adequate as larger 
firms tend to be more highly capitalized, but 
also because larger firms are better able to 
overcome the collective-action problem in 
lobbying for their political interest (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2002). 
 
The third factor-based dimension of interest to 
our model is education, as an indicator of 
“human capital.” As recent work on the 
determinants of opinion formation on trade 
issues has aptly demonstrated, higher levels of 
education, or higher levels of specialized skills, 
lead to a greater propensity to support freer 
trade for two interrelated reasons. First, since 
the U.S. is globally more competitive in sectors 
that require higher skills and more specialized 
training, more educated workers are more 
likely to find themselves employed in Indus-
tries that benefit from open markets. Second, 
as more educated workers tend to acquire 
skills that are more readily transferable from 
one occupation to another, they tend to be 
less vulnerable to the adjustment costs 
associated with trade liberalization. On the 
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whole, if offshoring politics conforms to a 
standard factor-based model of trade politics, 
there is no a priori reason to assume that the 
same logic should not apply.  
 
We use two complementary measures of 
education. The proportion of high-school 
graduates as a percentage of the state’s 
working-age population measures skill 
acquisition at a more basic level. The second 
measure, which refers to college or university 
graduates, refers to higher levels of skills.5 
Both measures are hypothesized to be 
negatively correlated to levels of anti-
offshoring legislative activity. 
 
The Partisan Context 
 
The central role of the labor-capital dimension 
in the political economy of offshoring in-
creases the saliency of partisan considerations 
in a political context where organized labor is 
closely allied with one of the two major 
parties. As discussed above, the Democrats 
clearly have been the most vocal critics of the 
practice of offshore outsourcing, but a sig-
nificant number of conservative Republicans 
have joined their voices to the chorus. In all, 
more than a third of the 130 bills under study 
were introduced by a Republican or were 
bipartisan in nature. Anecdotally, the reasons 
invoked by Republicans to support anti-
offshoring legislation were very similar to 
those invoked by Democrats.6 Thus, we 
 
                                                                                    
5 Interestingly, the proportion of college and 
university graduate in the working-age population 
is closely related (r = 0.79) to a measure of employ-
ment in occupations commonly identified as 
exposed to offshoring, including the following: 
Computer and Mathematical Sciences, Telemarket-
ers, Computer Operators, Data Entry Keyers, Word 
Processors and Typists and Desktop Publishers. 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2003). Entering 
this variable in the equations reported below only 
affects the university education parameters. Other 
parameters become slightly less significant but 
remain similar. 
6 See this article about two very different legislators 
who both took on the cause of opposing offshoring 
practices: “Roughly 180 degrees separate their 
political philosophies. But when it comes to 
include a variable in our equations to reflect 
the partisan mix of the state legislatures. We 
use the proportion of Democrats in the State 
House (state representatives) in 2002 
(National Conference of State Legislatures 
2002). We expect the effect of this variable to 
be positive. 
 
The Overall Employment Context 
 
The debate over offshoring is primarily about 
jobs. In the worst-case scenario mentioned 
above (McCarthy 2002), a total of about 
300,000 jobs might be lost annually as a 
consequence of offshoring. This is not an 
insignificant figure, but this number is 
dwarfed by the total number of workers who 
change jobs every year in the United States. In 
2004, for example, the totals of job termina-
tions and hired workers each were more than 
4 million every month (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics data). Still, other things being equal, 
in states where job creation does not follow 
the rate of job losses, the incentive should be 
higher for workers to demand (and politicians 
supply) restrictions on offshoring. To measure 
this overall employment context variable, we 
use a simple measure of the percentage of jobs 
lost of gained in the state over the previous 
five-year period (Total state employment in 
2004 as a percentage of the same figure for 
1999). This variable should be negatively 
related to legislative activity on offshoring. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Two variables are added to our explanatory 
model as controls. The first is the size of the 
state’s service economy, which of course 
closely correlates with the size of the state 
economy and population. Size matters for 
three distinct reasons that push in the same 
direction. First, the larger the state’s service 
economy, the larger and more diversified the 
size of the constituency that might benefit 
from various regulatory restrictions on 
 
offshore outsourcing, all partisan, cultural and 
geographical bets are off – State Senators Shirley 
Turner (Democrat) of New Jersey’s 15th District and 
Jeff Drozda (Republican) of Indiana’s 21st District 
are on the same page” (Parry 2004).  
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offshoring. Other things being equal, a larger 
and more diversified service economy would 
generate demands for a greater variety of 
legislative responses, and thus a larger 
number of bills or measures. Second, since a 
larger service economy might be assumed to 
be more self-sufficient, the cost for the state 
government of imposing restrictions on out-of-
state procurement should be higher in smaller 
states than in larger states. Third, it is well 
known that legislatures in larger states tend 
to be more professionalized than their 
counterparts in small states, and thus prone 
to introduce a larger number of legislative 
measures, other things being equal. For these 
reasons, we expect the size of the service 
economy to be positively related to offshoring 
legislative activity.  
 
The other control variable is a measure of the 
projected impact of the balance of offshoring 
and “inshoring” in all states. Not all states are 
similarly affected, as jobs in the sectors 
affected by the phenomenon are not evenly 
distributed across states. Presumably, in 
states where objective conditions allow 
economic agents and policy makers to be more 
optimistic about the effects of offshoring, there 
should be less demand and supply for 
legislation to curtail it. To measure expected 
effects on the state economy, we use a recent 
study that estimates state-by-state net 
employment effects of offshoring in the 
services sector in 2004 from offshoring of 
service jobs related to information 
technologies (Global Insight 2004). While the 
authors are particularly optimistic (only 
Kansas, Colorado and Washington have net 
job losses), they identify well the sectors 
affected by the phenomenon. More pessimistic 
assumptions would lead to a rescaling of the 
numbers, but there is no a priori reason to 
assume that the distribution would be 
markedly different. Here we use the projected 
gain in proportion of total employment, which 
gives an estimate of the impact on the 
economy as a whole. The effect is expected to 
be negative. Because of the conceptual 
proximity of this variable to the dependent 
variables and because this particular study 
may not reflect a consensus on the estimated 
effects of offshoring on state economies, we 
test estimate our models alternatively with 
and without this variable. 
 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
We assess the effects of our ten independent 
variables on three different but closely related 
indicators of legislative activity on offshoring. 
For each variable, four different equations are 
estimated (see Table 2, pp. 13-14). Taken as a 
whole, these regressions show that some 
variables have a consistent pattern of effect on 
the various representations of the dependent 
variable, while others have effects that are at 
best sporadic, at worst consistently flat.  
 
Among the questions raised above, one can be 
confidently answered. These results show that 
the politics of offshoring is not trade politics 
as usual. Indeed, our indicator of import sen-
sitivity, generally associated with protectionist 
regions, has no effect. Export dependence, 
which has been shown to relate with support 
for freer trade in recent studies, is positively 
related to anti-offshoring legislative activity in 
ten of our twelve specifications. In sum, if free 
traders may be right in calling offshoring “just 
another form of trade” and opposition to it 
“just another form of protectionism,” the poli-
tical coalitions that are likely to form on either 
side of the issue are unlikely to precisely 
match those active over trade policy.  
 
These results also suggest that the politics of 
offshoring is most adequately defined by the 
factoral approach to the political economy of 
globalization. The strongest and most 
consistent predictor of legislative activity on 
offshoring is the proportion of union members 
in the state’s workforce, which is significant in 
all the models and all other unreported trials 
as well. The indicator of capital intensity we 
use shows no effect across the models, but it 
may not be the best indicator for the task. 
Education has a mixed effect. In most 
specifications of the model, the proportion of 
high-school graduates in the state’s adult 
workforce has a significant effect in the 
predicted direction. The effect of the other 
education variable, the proportion of college 
 Notes & Analyses # 5  Avril/April 2005 
 
 9 
and university graduates in the population 
over 25 years of age, has an effect opposite to 
expectations, which achieves statistical signif-
icance in a few cases. This result is better 
understood when one considers the high 
correlation between this indicator and an 
indicator of employment in selected services 
industries often associated with the practice of 
offshoring.  
 
The close association between labor unions 
and the Democratic Party, whose members 
were responsible for nearly two-thirds of the 
legislative proposals under study reinforces 
the sectoral nature of the political cleavages 
involved in the politics of offshoring. The parti-
san composition of the state legislatures itself, 
however, does not have any measurable 
impact on their propensity to generate 
legislative proposals.  
 
Our two control variables have significant—or 
nearly significant—effects in the expected 
direction in most specifications. The variable 
representing each state’s balance of costs and 
benefits from outsourcing does not have as 
strong and consistent an effect as initially 
expected. This may be explainable if we 
account for the general tendency of U.S. 
legislators to respond more readily to losses or 
loss aversion then to gains or the prospect of 
gains (for a good explanation of this tendency 
as it applies to the U.S. Congress, see: Arnold 
1992). 
 
Not surprisingly, legislators in larger states 
were more likely to generate bills or measures 
to counter offshoring. Part of this effect, of 
course, depends on the presence of California, 
the largest state, which also generated the 
largest amount of legislative activity. 
Removing California from the sample (unre-
ported results) affects our models somewhat. 
It makes the size indicator drop from 
significance, but the effects of unionization, 
education and export dependence remain 
qualitatively similar to the effects observed on 
the full sample.  
Conclusion 
 
When it comes to debates over globalization, 
offshoring may be, as some argue, nothing 
more than the flavor of the month, soon to be 
replaced by another ill-founded reason to 
panic about the unstoppable progress of 
global markets. Given the attention that this 
issue has attracted since the first reports of 
call-centers moving to India started coming 
out in the U.S. media, one might at first be 
surprised that there has not been more 
assertive policy responses. Yet, if the flurry of 
legislative activity that has occurred in most of 
the states is any indication, we most probably 
have not seen the end of the politics of 
offshoring. Therein lies the interest of this first 
attempt to identify the forces at play in this 
fast-evolving dimension of globalization. 
 
In sum, we find that this new battleground of 
globalization does not look quite like the old 
familiar battlegrounds of trade protectionism. 
Most notably, the central opposition of import-
sensitive areas against export-dependent 
areas finds no trace in the picture of the 
political economy of offshoring as it emerges 
from our analysis. Also, although we do not 
have adequate data on the political strength of 
business across states to fully endorse this 
argument, we find that the troops in this 
battle seem to be very clearly aligned along 
class lines. Thus, if class compromise 
arguably was an important characteristic of 
the rapid expansion of trade in manufactured 
products that occurred a half-century ago, the 
current rapid expansion of trade in services is 
unlikely to mirror this image. 
 
Much, of course, remains to be done to better 
understand the politics of offshoring. First, the 
policies that we target in this paper are still in 
the making. As this paper is completed, most 
of the legislations that we discuss are still 
slowly making their way through the 
legislative process. Not all of them will become 
law, and of those that do, perhaps few will 
make a significant dent into the advance of 
globalization in the service sector. Indeed, 
many of these measures may turn out to be 
overruled by international trade agreement or 
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struck down on constitutional grounds. Still, 
they remain a telling indicator of the level of 
political resistance to offshoring in the United 
States. Other dimensions of this phenomenon 
will need to be addressed if political 
economists wish to understand it more fully. 
For example, what are the determinants of 
individual opinion formation on this new issue 
and how do they differ from the determinants 
of opinion on other dimensions of 
globalization, such as trade or immigration? 
When Congress enters into the fray and 
enacts legislation, a clearer picture also will 
emerge of the state of opposing forces on this 
new front and new data will be available to 
paint it. Finally, political economists will have 
to look at comparative patterns of policy 
making, as different countries confront the 
challenges of the new jobs migration. 
The Political Economy of State-Level 
Legislative Response to Services Offshoring in 
the United States, 2003-2004  
 
Offshoring is the latest battleground of resistance to 
globalization. It has led to political activity by labor 
groups and to the introduction of a few bills in 
Congress, but it also opened the door to 
protectionism at the state level. This paper seeks to 
explain variations in levels of legislative activity in 
response to offshoring. First, we summarize recent 
debates over offshoring, and compare them with 
debates over trade. Second, models of protectionist 
politics are discussed with regards to their 
usefulness in the explanation of levels of policy 
restrictions toward offshore outsourcing. We find 
that the politics of response to offshoring is not trade 
politics as usual, as export orientation is positively 
related to our measures of legislative activity. The 
forces behind the first legislative salvos in the fight 
against offshoring are primarily aligned along class 
rather than sectoral lines. Education, which is often 
used as an indicator of individual capacity to adapt 
to globalization, has mixed effects. 
 
This paper was presented at the 65th Annual 
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, Illinois, April 7-10, 2005. The authors 
thank François Vaillancourt and Kenneth Scheve for 
their comments and suggestions, and Linda Lee for 
her role in collecting the data on state legislative 
responses to service-jobs offshoring. Preliminary 
draft: suggestions and comments are welcome. 
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Table 1. Distribution of Legislative Responses to Offshoring across the 50 States, with Selected 
Independent Variables  
States Bills Measures 
Weighted 
Measures 
Offshoring 
gains % 
Export 
dep. % 
% Union 
members 
% H.S. 
Graduates 
California 16 18 12.17 .0096 9.8 18.8 76.8 
Connecticut 8 13 10.00 .0033 7.5 17.7 84.0 
New York 7 7 4.33 .0140 4.5 26.5 79.1 
Washington 6 10 8.17 .0113 11.7 20.0 87.1 
Illinois 6 10 6.50 .0052 7.1 20.6 81.4 
Missouri 6 9 6.17 -.0018 7.1 14.6 81.3 
Alabama 6 6 3.83 .0168 7.3 10.6 75.3 
Tennessee 5 7 4.83 .0208 6.8 10.5 75.9 
New Jersey 5 6 4.67 .0186 4.8 20.6 82.1 
Minnesota 5 6 4.33 .0034 7.0 18.3 74.6 
Indiana 4 5 3.33 .0153 9.5 14.5 82.1 
Louisiana 4 5 2.50 .0161 5.3 10.3 74.8 
Mississippi 4 4 3.00 .0122 6.9 8.2 72.9 
Georgia 4 4 2.83 .0139 5.9 7.0 78.6 
Ohio 3 10 8.33 .0076 9.5 17.9 83.0 
Kansas 3 5 3.83 -.0072 6.2 9.9 86.0 
Michigan 3 5 2.33 .0121 9.5 21.8 83.4 
Colorado 3 4 3.50 .0134 6.8 9.0 86.9 
Virginia 3 3 2.00 .0178 5.2 7.8 81.5 
Arizona 2 4 3.50 .0187 6.4 6.6 81.0 
North Carolina 2 4 2.67 .0158 8.9 4.0 78.1 
West Virginia 2 3 2.33 .0160 3.5 14.1 75.2 
Wisconsin 2 2 1.67 .0112 8.1 16.4 85.1 
Iowa 2 2 1.33 .0089 8.4 13.7 86.1 
Kentucky 2 2 1.33 .0110 9.9 11.3 74.1 
Rhode Island 2 2 1.33 .0125 5.5 17.9 78.0 
Vermont 2 2 1.17 .0079 9.0 11.1 86.4 
Maryland 2 2 1.00 .0177 3.1 16.7 83.8 
Florida 2 2 0.83 .0151 2.8 7.5 79.9 
Hawaii 1 3 2.67 .0139 1.4 25.3 84.6 
South Carolina 1 3 2.50 .0113 9.3 6.1 76.3 
Delaware 1 2 1.50 .0110 3.9 11.8 82.6 
Massachusetts 1 1 0.67 .0105 6.9 15.5 84.8 
Nebraska 1 1 0.67 .0069 7.1 11.2 86.6 
New Mexico 1 1 0.67 .0163 17.3 8.5 78.9 
South Dakota 1 1 0.67 .0085 7.0 6.9 84.6 
Idaho 1 1 0.33 .0107 16.5 8.7 84.7 
Pennsylvania 1 1 0.17 .0163 5.6 16.6 81.9 
Nevada 1 1 0.00 .0170 1.4 16.7 80.7 
Alaska 0 0 0.00 .0121 2.2 26.9 88.3 
Arkansas 0 0 0.00 .0143 6.3 6.7 75.3 
Maine 0 0 0.00 .0132 5.0 15.0 85.4 
Montana 0 0 0.00 .0097 1.8 15.5 87.2 
New Hampshire 0 0 0.00 .0057 10.5 11.2 87.4 
North Dakota 0 0 0.00 .0127 2.4 9.8 83.9 
Oklahoma 0 0 0.00 .0087 5.4 10.6 80.6 
Oregon 0 0 0.00 -.0024 9.5 16.4 85.1 
Texas 0 0 0.00 .0147 8.1 6.5 75.7 
Utah 0 0 0.00 .0135 7.2 7.6 87.7 
Wyoming 0 0 0.00 .0040 0.8 9.9 87.9 
Means 2.62 3.54 2.47 .0113 6.8 13.4 81.7 
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Table 2. Regression Results for the Number of Bills Introduced in Each State, Number of Legislative Measures, and the Number of Legislative 
Measures Weighted by their Respective Levels of Restrictiveness (Tobit regression with robust standard errors) 
 
 Equation 1 (all variables included)
  
  Number of Bills Number of Measures Weighted Measures
  
    Coefficient S.E. z-score Coefficient S.E. z-score Coefficient S.E. z-score
Export dependence 0,20 0,10 2,04 ** 0,34 0,14 2,39 ** 0,87 0,44 1,95 * 
Import sensitivity 0,10 0,26 0,39 -0,13 0,33 -0,40 -0,09 1,10 -0,08  
High-school education -0,35 0,12 -2,85 *** -0,35 0,17 -2,04 ** -1,10 0,68 -1,63  
College education 0,19 0,11 1,74 * 0,17 0,17 1,04 0,67 0,67 1,00  
Union membership 0,22 0,08 2,86 *** 0,29 0,11 2,69 *** 1,05 0,48 2,20 ** 
Size of firms -0,09 0,28 -0,33 0,18 0,37 0,48 -0,43 1,44 -0,30  
Job Growth 0,00 0,16 0,03 -0,20 0,21 -0,94 -0,74 0,79 -0,93  
Democrats 0,00 0,03 -0,14 -0,02 0,04 -0,49 -0,10 0,14 -0,74  
GSP in services (log.n.) 1,17 0,63 1,86 * 1,31 0,79 1,66 * 5,07 3,17 1,60  
Offshoring gains -96,17 42,48 -2,26 ** -91,32 71,45 -1,28 -478,52 315,26 -1,52  
Constant 10,92 9,97 1,10 7,83 14,24 0,55 31,42 55,08 0,57  
     
Log pseudolikelihood -93,48 -106,09 -188,43  
Prob > chi2 0,00 0,00 0,00  
 Equation 2 (without offshoring gain variable)
  
  Number of Bills Number of Measures Weighted Measures
    
  Coefficient S.E. z-score Coefficient S.E.   z-score Coefficient S.E. z-score
Export dependence 0,19 0,09 2,10 ** 0,33 0,13 2,43 ** 0,75 0,46 1,63  
Import sensitivity 0,07 0,26 0,26 -0,16 0,33 -0,50 -0,22 1,11 -0,20  
High-school education -0,35 0,13 -2,71 *** -0,35 0,18 -1,96 ** -1,08 0,72 -1,50  
College education 0,19 0,11 1,64 0,17 0,17 1,00 0,61 0,69 0,88  
Union membership 0,19 0,07 2,67 *** 0,27 0,10 2,64 *** 0,91 0,43 2,12 ** 
Size of firms -0,15 0,30 -0,49 0,13 0,40 0,32 -0,81 1,61 -0,51  
Job Growth -0,05 0,16 -0,32 -0,25 0,20 -1,27 -0,98 0,73 -1,34  
Democrats -0,01 0,03 -0,34 -0,02 0,04 -0,60 -0,13 0,15 -0,89  
GSP in services (log n.) 1,19 0,65 1,83 ** 1,33 0,81 1,64 5,22 3,33 1,57  
Constant 11,69 10,37 1,13 8,58 14,72 0,58 34,96 58,87 0,59  
     
Log pseudolikelihood -95,07 -106,84 -189,73  
Prob > chi2 0,00 0,00 0,00  
  
  
Significant at 1% level *** 
Significant at 5% level ** 
Significant at 10% level * 
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Table 2. Regression Results for the Number of Bills Introduced in Each State, Number of Legislative Measures, and the Number of Legislative 
Measures Weighted by their Respective Levels of Restrictiveness (Tobit regression with robust standard errors) 
 
 Equation 3 (without import sensitivity, size of firms and percentage of Democrats)
 
  Number of Bills Number of Measures Weighted Measures
  
  Coefficient S.E. z-score Coefficient S.E.   z-score Coefficient S.E. z-score
Export dependence 0,22 0,12 1,86 * 0,31 0,13  2,30 ** 0,91 0,50 1,84 *
High-school education -0,34 0,10 -3,25 *** -0,29 0,13 -2,25 ** -0,81 0,56 -1,44  
College education 0,17 0,09 1,83 * 0,14 0,15 0,94 0,60 0,68 0,88  
Union membership 0,21 0,07 3,02 *** 0,27 0,09  2,96 *** 0,96 0,40 2,40 **
Job Growth -0,03 0,10 -0,35 -0,13 0,13 -1,02 -0,61 0,56 -1,09  
GSP in services (log n.)   1,10 0,48 2,32 ** 1,58 0,58 2,74 *** 5,03 2,35 2,14 **
Offshoring gains   -98,16 45,58 -2,15 ** -90,84 75,59 -1,20 -527,59 337,35 -1,56
Constant    10,43 6,66 1,57 1,78 9,72 0,18 -1,23 44,77 -0,03
         
Log pseudolikelihood -93,62  -106,35  -188,70  
Prob > chi2 0,00  0,00  0,00  
    
 Equation 4 (same as equation 3 without offshoring gain variable)
 
  Number of Bills Number of Measures Weighted Measures
     
     Coefficient S.E. z-score Coefficient S.E. z-score Coefficient S.E. z-score
Export dependence 0,22 0,12 1,83 * 0,30 0,14  2,22 ** 0,81 0,52 1,55
High-school education -0,33 0,11 -2,97 *** -0,28 0,13 -2,12 ** -0,70 0,57 -1,22  
College education 0,18 0,10 1,81 * 0,15 0,15 0,99 0,60 0,69 0,87  
Union membership 0,18 0,07 2,77 *** 0,25 0,09  2,82 *** 0,80 0,36 2,24 **
Job Growth -0,07 0,09 -0,79 -0,17 0,12 -1,44 -0,79 0,49 -1,60  
GSP in services (log n.)   1,09 0,49 2,21 ** 1,57 0,58 2,68 *** 4,84 2,40 2,02 **
Constant 8,97   7,28 1,23 0,41 10,03 0,04 -10,69 46,15 -0,23
         
Log pseudolikelihood -95,31  -107,13  -190,35  
Prob > chi2 0,00  0,00  0,00  
    
Significant at 1% level ***   
Significant at 5% level **   
Significant at 10% level *   
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Figure 1.  Geographic Distribution of Legislative Activity in Response to Offshoring: Number of Bills Introduced in State Legislatures 
in 2003 and 2004 
Source: National Foundation for American Policy. 2004. Global Sourcing Information: Table Tracking State and Federal Global Sourcing Legislation. 
<http://nfap.net/researchactivities/globalsourcing/appendix.aspx>.   
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Classification of Services Offshoring Measures : Restrictiveness Scale 
 
1.00 Limitations on private information leaving the country or state 
Obligation of identification and divulgation of location for call centers 
0.83 Limitations of access to public programs for offshoring private firms 
Repayment of benefits received from public programs for offshoring private firms 
Private firms offshoring must announce its intention to the state ahead of time 
0.67     All public procurement contracts given to local company or company employing American citizens. 
General preferential treatment given to local or American firms on public procurement contracts 
0.50 Public procurement contracts given to local company or company employing American citizens in specific sectors 
Preferential treatment given to local or American firms on public procurement contracts in specific sectors 
Public procurements must contain a minimum American content 
0.33  Restrictions on public procurement contracts given to foreign firms 
Preferences to local or American firms for public procurement contracts 
0.17 Tie-ins on similar bids for public procurement contracts given to local or American firms 
Transparency policy for public agencies giving public procurement contracts to foreign firms 
Commission studies on the impact of offshoring 
Pressure on Congress on offshoring-related matter 
0 No measure was introduced in the state. 
 
 
Definition of Independent Variables 
 
Import-sensitive jobs : Jobs in selected sectors as proportion of total non-farm jobs. Annual Survey of Manufactures, 2001, 
Census Bureau. Selected sectors come from Griswold (1999). Import-sensible sectors and their NICS codes are: Textile 
Mills (313), Textile Product Mills (314), Apparel Manufacturing (315), Leather and allied product manufacturing  (316), 
Sawmills and wood preservation (3211), Other wood product manufacturing  (3219), Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 
(3221), Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing  (3254), Clay product and refractory manufacturing  (3271), Iron and 
steel mills and ferroalloy manufacturing (3311), Alumina and aluminium production and processing  (3313), Nonferrous 
metal (except aluminium) production and processing (3314), Industrial machinery manufacturing  (3332), Commercial 
and service industry machinery manufacturing (3333), Ventilation, heating, air-conditioning, and commercial refrigeration 
equipment manufacturing  (3334), Engine, turbine, and power transmission equipment manufacturing (3336), Computer 
and peripheral equipment manufacturing  (3341), Audio and video equipment manufacturing  (3343), Semiconductor and 
other electronic component manufacturing (3344), Navigational, measuring, medical and control instruments 
manufacturing (3345), Motor vehicle parts manufacturing  (3363), Other transportation equipment manufacturing  (3369), 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  (339). 
Exports-related jobs: proportion of total non-farm jobs due to manufacturing exports, 1997, Office of Trade and Economic 
Analysis, Department of Commerce. 
Jobs Growth: Variation in total job level, 1999-2004, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Size of firms: Average number of employees per private firm, first semester, 2002, from “Employment and Wages, Annual 
Averages, 2002”, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Unionization: Percentage of workforce represented by an union, 2002, Bureau of labor Statistics. 
High School Education: Percentage of residents age 25 or older with a high school diploma or higher, 2000, Census 
Bureau. 
College Education: Percentage of residents age 25 or older with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 2000, Census Bureau. 
Democrats in House: percentage of Democrats in office in state House, 2002, National Conference of State Legislatures 
GSP in Services: Gross State Product in the Services sector, 2001, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic 
Accounts.  
Offshoring gains: Estimated number of jobs in service sectors gained because of IT offshoring as percentage of total 
employment, 2003, from The Impact of Offshore IT Software and Services Offshoring on the U.S. Economy and the IT 
Industry, Global Insight Inc, for the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA). 
 Notes & Analyses # 5  Avril/April 2005 
 
   
 
Notes & Analyses sur les États-Unis/on the USA 
 
Cette série est publiée par la Chaire d’études politiques et économiques américaines de l’Université 
de Montréal (www.cepea.umontreal.ca). Elle présente des travaux de synthèse, des analyses plus 
approfondies et des notes de recherche sur des enjeux contemporains touchant la politique et 
l’économie aux États-Unis. 
 
This series is published by the Chair in American Political and Economic Studies at the Université de 
Montréal (www.cepea.umontreal.ca). It features short notes, analytical works and working papers on 
contemporary political and economic issues in the United States. 
  
 
Déjà parus / Published : 
 
5. Pierre Martin and/et Christian Trudeau, The Political Economy of State-Level Legislative 
Response to Services Offshoring in the United States, 2003-2004 (working paper / note de 
recherche), April/Avril 2005. 
 
4. Richard Nadeau et Pierre Martin, La présidentielle de 2004.  Une lutte serrée, des conventions 
au vote… et au delà (Analyse), Novembre 2004. 
 
3. Daniel Brisson, Alexandre Carette et Pasquale Salvaggio, Élections présidentielles américaines. 
Comment se distinguent les candidats sur les principaux enjeux de politique étrangère ? (Note), 
Octobre 2004. 
 
2. Linda Lee, Les politiques d’achat chez nous à l’américaine : le retour en force des lois « Buy 
American » aux États-Unis (Note), Septembre 2004. 
 
1. Linda Lee, Délocalisation outre frontière de l’emploi : le point sur l’activité législative aux États-
Unis (Note), juin 2004. 
 
 
 
